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BOOK REVIEW
CASES AND MATERIALS -ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

By Robert J. Levy, Thomas P. Lewis, and Peter W. Martin.
Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1971. xxi
+ 1,594 pages. $20.50.
DANIEL KATKIN

There is an anomalous quality 'about this book. Virtually
every page documents the bankruptcy of the War on Poverty;
yet the simple fact that the book exists is evidence that the War
has not been altogether unsuccessful. Reading Social Welfare and
the Individual, one gets the unhappy feeling that the lot of the
poor has changed very little. However, the very fact that there is
a demand for books such as this,' and that there is ample source
material from which to derive their contents, suggests that the
legal profession is changing. And it may well be that such a change
in the attitudes and values of the legal profession is an essential
precondition to significantly changing the lot of the poor.
The evidence clearly suggests that the domestic "War" waged
by the Johnson administration has fared no better than the foreign one. The dream that the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964 2 might become the cornerstone of a successful effort to
eradicate poverty clearly seems to have perished. Experts discussing various aspects of the War on Poverty seem to agree unanimously "that federally financed . . . programs have so far not

resulted in any observable changes in the predicament of the
poor." 3 In fact, in 1969 the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare of the Senate, while recommending the extension of the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) for two years, virtually
declared that the dream had perished by commenting casually
*
Assistant Professor of Social Welfare, State University of New York at Buffalo.
B.A., City College of New York, 1965; J.D.. Columbia University, 1968; Dip. in Criminology, (Cantab.), 1969.
1. See also P. DODYK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY (1969).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2701-2994d (1970).
8. K. CLARK & J. HoPKINs, A RELEVANT WAR AGAINST POVERTY 249 (1968): See also
D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASILE MISUNDERSTANDING 130 (1969).
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that the program "offers no direct, immediate prospect of turning widespread poverty into universal prosperity." 4
Yet it is not fair to say that there is nothing new under the
sun. The values and attitudes of substantial numbers of Americans seem to have changed. There is a new political consciousness,5 particularly visible among the young and members of
minority groups, and there even seems-to have been a significant
change within segments of the legal profession. 6 Indeed a whole
new concern with the legal problems of the poor seems to have
developed. A note in the HarvardLaw Review observed that:
With startling suddenness the legal profession has recently come to
realize that a society can guarantee equal justice only by providing
all citizens with effective access to the institutions by which justice
is obtained . . . . [TJhe New Wave in legal services is a recognition
that the overriding interest of the poor is the elimination of poverty, an interest which lawyers for the poor must represent as advocates. 7
The literature of the profession has seen a proliferation of articles
dealing not only with the form and functions which legal services
should take," but also with commentaries on the substantive issues
with which poverty lawyers must deal.
That lawyers have undertaken new types of cases, and begun
to respond to the problems of the poor is most easily seen by observing the fact that "judicial attention to welfare programs has
increased exponentially in the last few years (a trend which shows
no sign of slacking)."'10 Indeed, that trend is so extreme that the
authors of this book complain of the difficulty in keeping the
material current. So much business is being transacted so quickly
by the courts, that galley proofs of such a book as this are likely to
be obsolete by the time they return from the printer.1
4. S. REP. No. 91-453, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1969).
5. See generally C. REIcH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1971).
6. See generally pp. 1423-1519.
7. Note, Neighborhood Legal Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor,
80 HARv. L. REV. 805 (1967).
8. See especially Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
9. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, TAE LAW OF THE POOR (1966); Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
10. P. xi.
11. It should be noted that fully 70% of the cases included in the book were decided after 1964; and fully half have been decided more recently than the end of 1967.
The authors have done a magnificent job of keeping current with their fast-changing
subject matter.
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While the law schools may not always have been in-the forefront of these new "developments in the profession, they certainly
have not remained untouched. Many schools have developed law
reform units and special service- and training projects -which touch
upon problems of the poor,.12 At least three schools have begun

joint programs, leading to degrees both in law and social work.' 3
Everywhere, courses related to poverty and income maintenance
are being developed and; implemented. This is a development of
considerable importance, and it is in the light of this development that Social Welfafe and th'e Individual emerges 'as an important book.
Obviously, a b6ok is important not merely because there is a
need for it, but also because it adequately fills that need. The
judgment that a book is important subsumes' the judgment that
it is also good. On balance, Social Welfare and the Individual is
definitely a good book. But that judgment is certainly a matter of
balancing.
Conceptually the book may be divided into three parts: 14
The prologue, five chapters which relate to income maintenance
programs and social welfare legislation (of which two are very
good), and five chapters which relate to problems peculiar to the
poor, but not related to income maintenance (of which two are
very good). The limitations of this reviewer's expertise are of
such a nature that this review will focus on the prologue and the
almost 750 pages of the book which relate to income maintenance.
The Prologue
The first forty pages, while interesting, are disappointing.
They are designed to give the reader a sense of the magnitude of
the problem of poverty in our society. Interspersed with policy
analyses and statistics are occasional descriptions of the plight of
the poor. Thus, the reader learns not only that of the 25 million
Americans whose annual incomes 'fall below the poverty line
($3,500 for a family of four), 70% live in families with incomes at
least $500 below the poverty level, and 50% live in families with
12. Columbia Law School and New York University Law School, for example.
13. University of California at Berkeley, Washington University of St. Louis, and
State University of New York at Buffalo.
14. Levy, Lewis and Martin suggest this division themselves in the preface at xii.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

incomes at least $1,000 below the poverty standard,"0 but also
0
what it means to individuals to live on such limited incomes.'
What is missing from the prologue is a discussion of the vital
social and philosophical issues which are involved in the administration of social welfare programs. On the right, the argument has
been made that social welfare programs give government too much
control over the lives of individuals, and thus undermine the
individualism and self-reliance which are necessary in a free society.'7 On the left, the argument has been made that extension
of the rule of law 'I and traditional notions of property rights 10
into this area of law will guarantee the integrity of individuals,
while permitting the elimination of human misery.
A society in which a substantial number of people are dependent for their livelihoods upon the largess of government is a
society in which civil liberties are in danger. Whether there are
existing legal theories adequate to abate the danger is not only a
vitally important issue, but also an issue which has received considerable attention in professional literature. The absence from
the prologue of any materials relating to this great controversy is
very conspicuous.
Income Maintenance
Each of the four major chapters in this section of the book
focuses on the problems of a particular group of people (the aged,
dependent children, the disabled, and the unemployed). On first
blush such an approach to the complexities of social welfare legislation seems desirable indeed. The problems of each group promise to be unique, and dealing with each group ad seriatum seems
quite rational. There is, however, a difficulty which stems from
the fact that America's social response to the problems of poverty
and economic dislocation is considerably less than rational. Each
group of economically troubled people may be eligible for assistance from three or four different programs, and each program
15. Thus, it would be necessary to distribute 11 billion dollars among these 25 million people merely to bring each up to the poverty line.
16. A model budget on page 20 indicates that a family of four living on $3,500 a
-year has $122 per month for food, $91 for housing, $57 for clothing and personal care,
$6 for transportation, nothing for medical care, life insurance or gifts, and only $9 for
all other expenses (such as recreation, education, tobacco).
17. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SEPXDO,%f (1944).
18. Jones, The Rule of Law in The Welfare State, 58 COLUAf. L. REv. 143 (1958).
19. See Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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may be addressed to the members of as many as three "or four of
the groups. Consider the following chart.
TYPE OF PROGRAM

TYPE OF GROUP
Aging Children Disabled Unemployed

General Assistance

x

x

X

Categorical Assistance

x

X

x

Social Security

x

X

X

W orkmen s Compensation
Unemployment Insurance

x

x
x

A serious consequence of the decision to divide the content of this
part of the book into chapters about groups is that the authors
have made it very difficult for the reader to develop a comprehensive understanding of some of the programs.
Yet another problem is that some of the most important constitutional cases of the past decade have been either omitted from
the book altogether or presented in such a way as obfuscates their
real importance. Sherbert v. Verner 20 involved a Seventh-Day
Adventist who refused to accept employment that would have required work on the Sabbath. She had been found ineligible for
unemployment insurance on the ground that she had refused
without good cause to accept suitable employment when offered.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that governmental
units may not use the denial of a benefit as a tool with which to
coerce individuals not to exercise their constitutional rights. The
Court rejected the argument that because the state did not have
to give the benefit at all, it was free to give it with any conditions
it chose. Sherbert was a constitutional development of considerable importance, and its implications for the administration of all
types of social welfare programs are clear. Yet the organization of
the book is such that the implications of this case are understated
so that it appears limited to the narrower issue of whether the
first amendment protects religious freedom as "good cause" for
maintaining that work is not suitable within the meaning of an
unemployment insurance statute.
20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Shapiro v. Thompson 21 and Levy v. Louisiana2 2 are landmark cases in the development of the "new" equal protection
doctrine. Yet neither case receives more than fleeting comment
(not even about the constitutional issues in the case of Shapiro)
in a note.
Traditionally the equal protection clause has been held to
prohibit only those classifications made by a state which are not
rationally related to some legitimate state interest.2 The new
equal protection doctrine holds that a state classification which
tends to inhibit the exercise of some fundamental freedom is constitutionally permissible2 4only if it is necessary to achieve some
compelling state interest.
Thus, in Shapiro the Supreme Court struck down residence
requirements because they tended to inhibit the exercise of the
fundamental freedom to travel interstate without promoting a
compelling state interest. The note in this casebook which discusses this case is concerned only with residence requirements;
the constitutional ratio decidendi receives no attention at all.
In Levy the Court held that a statute which limited the right
to bring wrongful death suits to legitimate children worked a
deprivation of equal protection to illegitimates. Under traditional equal protection standards both a legitimate purpose (discouraging illegitimacy) and a rational relationship between the
statute and that purpose might well have been found. Levy employed the new equal protection standard, and found no compelling interest to be served by the Louisiana statute. Its importance
as an equal protection case is considerable. Yet, even though the
rights of illegitimates are discussed at some length in the chapter
on children, Levy receives no more than a single sentence in a
note.
It is difficult to understand the authors' lack of concern for
constitutional issues. It is as if they have conscientiously omitted
cases which deal with "vague" concepts (such as equal protection
and due process) in order to make more room for the types of
cases which will develop technical expertise.
21.
22.
23.
35, 46-48
24.

394 U.S. 618 (1969).
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
See Katkin, Residence Requirements: The Unresolved Issues, 36 ALBANY L. REV.
(1971).
Id. at 48-54.
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Technical precision is indeed the great strength of this book.
Statutes and administrative regulations are examined in great
detail. Issues related to such things as eligibility, intergovernmental functioning, the definition of statutory terms, and the
realities of economic constraints are explicated at great length.
Social Welfare and the Individual is a virtual gold mine of information. One cannot escape the feeling that the authors of this
book know everything there is to know about social welfare programs.
But the great strength is the other side of the book's substantial weakness. The authors have sacrificed discussion of constitutional and social philosophical issues almost as if that were
necessary to achieve technical precision.
Two weaknesses in the book have so far been identified: a
failure of organization which makes it difficult for the reader to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the individual programs which constitute the nation's response to the problems of
poverty and economic dislocation, and a failure to adequately
address constitutional and philosophical issues. These weaknesses
are comparatively inconspicuous in the chapters on disability and
unemployment, which are, accordingly, the best parts of the book.
At the beginning of the chapter on disability, the authors
comment that the lack of program integration in this area requires
that each program be examined independently. The chapter is
broken into two parts, one on social security benefits for the disabled and one on workmen's compensation. The programmatic
approach (for which the authors seem to be apologetic) facilitates comprehension. In addition, the philosophical and constitutional issues simply do not have the same pressing quality in this
area; consequently their absence is not so important. Furthermore, in addition to the technical precision which characterizes
the entire book, there are particularly good discussions of policy
issues in this chapter.
In the materials on workmen's compensation these discussions involve such issues as: what element of a disability is compensated for-is it merely the loss of earnings, or can pain and
suffering be factors; to what extent can the negligence of the injured be offered as a defense by the insurer; what if an employee
was injured in a fight which, though it took place at work, did not
1003
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involve work related matters; what if the injured party provoked
the fight; what if a disability occurs at work but while the injured
was not performing a work related function (such as an outdoor
employee who is injured during working hours while trying to
save a drowning man); is the insurer totally liable if a preexisting disability is made total by a work related accident; and to what
extent can workmen's compensation laws be utilized to encourage
the employment of disabled persons.
The single most interesting issue raised by the materials on
disability insurance through the social security system involves
the concept of psychiatric disability. The social security statute
requires that injuries be medically provable. 2 The fact that differences in opinion among psychiatrists are often very pronounced, and the extent to which psychiatrists are dependent on
the subjective reporting of symptoms rather than on objective and
observable characteristics of disorders combine to make it very
difficult to satisfy the statutory requirement. Indeed, there is even
case law which stands for the proposition that chronic alcoholism
(a diagnosis on which psychiatrists are comparatively likely to be
able to agree and which has comparatively objective symptoms)
is not necessarily disabling within the meaning of the statute."
Marion v. Gardner27 is a particularly interesting case which held
that a committed sexual psychopath is disabled within the meaning of the statute and is thus eligible to collect social security
28
benefits during the period of his confinement.
The only shortcoming in the discussion of psychiatric disability is the failure to include some psychiatric literature. An
excerpt from the works of Thomas Szasz, a University of Syracuse
Professor of Psychiatry, who maintains that psychiatry is a pseudoscience comparable to alchemy and astrology 2 9 would be both
illuminating and provocative in this context.
The chapter on unemployment is also characterized by interesting material related to issues of social policy. Unemployment compensation insurance (the only program discussed in
25. 42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(3) (1970).
26. Osborne v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1969), reprinted at 631.
27. 359 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1966).
28. Let those who consider this just another example of "coddling," such as is no
longer likely to be found acceptable by the Supreme Court, note that the decision was
written by then Circuit Judge Blackmun.
29. T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
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this chapter) is not designed so much to alleviate the suffering of
the poor as to keep middle-class people from slipping into poverty. It is designed to give temporary assistance to members of the
labor force who are available for suitable employment, but who
are unable to find it. Many important issues arise from the concept of availability and the corollary notion that the unemployment be involuntary: Is unemployment involuntary if it arises
from misconduct by the employee; what constitutes misconduct;
can an employee who moves to a section of the country where he
is unlikely to be able to find suitable work maintain that he is
available within the meaning of the statute; may a union member
refuse to accept nonunion work and still be considered available;
if a union strike at one plant causes another to close, are members
of that union who work at the second plant involuntarily unemployed despite the fact that their problems stem from the voluntary actions of the organization that represents them in
labor-management negotiations.
A particularly interesting issue arises from the fact that unemployment compensation is an insurance program-that is, in
what manner are premiums to be assessed? There is considerable
controversy over experience ratings which would relate premiums to the rate of employee turnover at a plant. An employer who
provides stable ongoing employment opportunities would be rewarded by having lower premiums assessed. Such a scheme might
well provide incentives to employers to regularize their labor pool
and cut down on turnover. The possibility that social legislation
can be used not only as a remedy but as a positive tool of social
policy designed to prevent social problems is exciting.
The last chapter in this section of the book, which deals with
income maintenance alternatives (primarily the negative income
tax) is disappointing. In the chapters on unemployment and disability the reader expects (and wants) a considerable amount of
technical material. In this chapter, as in the chapters which discuss the welfare system, the absence of theoretical and philosophical considerations is particularly conspicuous. Once again the
reader gets the feeling that the authors perceive contract law,
accounting and economics as somehow more legitimate than jurisprudence.
Often the technical material reprinted is excellent. This is
1005

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

particularly true of the material on economics excerpted from the
testimony of Professor Milton Friedman before the House Ways
and Means Committee."0 But policy decisions about income maintenance alternatives cannot be made aside from considerations of
ethics and social philosophy. The way in which a people choose
to deal with poverty is a reflection of their values and attitudes.
Yet values and attitudes receive very little attention in this chapter.
This reviewer's judgment is that Social Welfare and the
Individual is indeed a good book. In places its organization provides difficulties for the reader; but they are not insurmountable.
In places the absence of "philosophical" considerations is very unfortunate; but that can be overcome by assigning a few essays or
law review articles which will provide enough background information so that students can find the philosophical issues on their
own. At places the remarkable extensiveness of the information
and ideas contained in the book is nothing less than impressive;
and that alone justifies the use of this book.
30. Hearings on H.R. 16311 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1945-48 & 1957 (1970), reprinted at 754-57.
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